II. Doubts about Equality

19. But about equality there are two doubts:

For first it seems it is not a distinct relation from identity and likeness because (as was said elsewhere [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221, d.10 n.30, d.13 nn.72, 80]) ‘infinite’ is not a special attribute but states a mode intrinsic to any attribute, - and by parity of reasoning ‘great’ does too, which as it were states indistinctly what ‘infinite’ states distinctly; therefore the magnitude of the essence is not distinct from the essence (and not by the distinction either that is between the attributes), and then equality according to this magnitude is not distinct from identity, which is according to the essence; likewise, magnitude is not distinct from wisdom, by the distinction that is between the attributes, -therefore equality in magnitude of wisdom is not distinct from likeness in wisdom. But every magnitude is either of the essence, according to which there is identity, - or of an attribute, according to which there is likeness; therefore no equality in divine reality seems to be distinct from identity and likeness.

20. Further, if also any attribute has its own proper magnitude, then equality seems to be founded in accord with any one of them; therefore there will be as many equalities of the persons as there are attributes.

21. As to the first [n.19], one can concede that - as in the case of creatures - there can be likeness without equality (as a weak white is like an intense white, although not perfectly), but not conversely, as to the form by which certain things are of a nature to be likened; and in this respect, by comparing certain things in the form according to which likeness is of a nature to exist, equality seems to quasi determine likeness and a foundation of likeness. So one can concede here that equality is not so distinct from identity and likeness as they are from each other, but it states a proper mode of the foundation of each of those two relations, and as it were also a mode proper to each relation, - because namely both identity and likeness are perfect; because if per impossibile the Father had a greater deity and the Son a lesser deity, there would be some identity, but because the foundation of the identity would not have the same magnitude, it would not be perfect identity, nor go along with equality; likewise, if per impossibile the Father had a greater knowledge and the Son a lesser one, they would be in some way alike, but because the mode of the foundation would be deficient - namely perfect magnitude - there would therefore not be a perfect likeness. But now the magnitude, which is as it were the mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, founds equality, which is as it were the mode of likeness and identity, - because it asserts each of them as perfect.

22. To the second [n.20] one can concede that there are as many perfections in God simply as there are also magnitudes and equalities; however just as all of them are simply one thing, so too ‘the equalities in accord with them’ are simply one thing. And from this is plain how the Master - distinction 19 ch.1 n.168 - well assigned ‘a perfect equality’ in the three (according to Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4), namely ‘in magnitude, in power, and in eternity’; by magnitude indeed is understood equality in all attributes (taking magnitude not for any distinct attribute, but as it is common to the magnitude of any attribute at all), and by power they are indicated to be equal as to objects outside, and by eternity equality is indicated to be in them as it were in duration. But equality according to discrete quantity is not looked for there, but to continuous quantities in creatures - which are permanent and successive quantity - there correspond there magnitude and eternity.